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The possibility that a substantial payment of money made by
a company to the widow or beneficiary of a deceased employee may
be deductible for income tax purposes by the company, and tax
free to the widow or beneficiary, makes this subject one of consider-
able interest to taxpayers. Futhermore, the volume of current cases
on this subject is sufficiently large and the divergence of judicial
opinion so marked as to make this a subject of timely and continuing
interest to the practitioner.
We are here concerned only with the more recent developments
in the tax treatment of voluntary payments made to the estate or
beneficiaries of a deceased employee, as distinguished from payments
made pursuant to a contract (express or implied),' or payments of
amounts in which the deceased employee had a nonforfeitable interest
under a qualified profit-sharing, pension or stock bonus plan, or
under some other form of nonqualified deferred compensation ar-
rangement. Section 101 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 pro-
vides for a $5,000 exclusion from gross income for amounts re-
ceived by the estate or beneficiaries of a deceased employee if paid
by reason of the death of the employee, except for amounts in which
the employee had, immediately prior to death, a nonforfeitable right
to receive while living. An exception to the exception is provided with
respect to amounts paid under certain qualified profit-sharing, pen-
sion or stock bonus plans, even though nonforfeitable, which are
entitled to the $5,000 exclusion.2
Except for payments deemed to be gifts and except for amounts
qualifying for the $5,000 exclusion, all other payments would be
income and would qualify as income in respect of a decedent, 3 the
treatment of which is beyond the scope of this article.
* Partner, Law Firm of Knepper, White, Richards, Miller & Roberts, Columbus,
Ohio; Member, Tax Section of the American Bar Association.
I A contractual obligation to make such payments may be implied from an estab-
.lished practice of the employer in making such payments or from the adoption of a
plan to do so. In such case, the payments, subject to the $5,000 exclusion provided
by § 101(b) (2) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, constitute taxable income.
Bausch's Estate v. Comm'r, 186 F.2d 313, 40 Am. Fed. Tax R. 61 (7th Cir. 1951).
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101(b) (2) (B).
3 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 691. O'Daniel Estate v. Comm'r, 173 F.2d 966, 37 Am.
Fed. Tax R. 1249, 49-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9235 (2d Cir. 1949).
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For a more comprehensive treatment of the background of this
subject there have been published several excellent articles.4 Let
us examine the tax treatment of the voluntary payment as to both
the payee and the payor.
TAX TREATMENT OF AMOUNTS RECEIVED By Wmow
For ease of reference we shall refer to payments received by
the widow. This is not to suggest that payments received by other
beneficiaries should be treated differently. The general problem arises
in distinguishing whether the payment is a gift, and therefore ex-
cluded from gross income,' or a non-donative payment of some kind
which is included within gross income and so taxable.6
In the recent case of Commissioner v. Duberstein7 the Supreme
Court made a rather comprehensive analysis of the concept of
"gift," as distinguished from a non-donative payment, for federal
income tax purposes. The Duberstein case did not involve a volun-
tary payment to the beneficiary of a deceased employee, but involved
the presentation of a Cadillac in appreciation for certain customer
information provided to the "donor" company by the "donee" of the
Cadillac. The Court pointed out that the concept of "gift" as used
within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code is not the same
as used in the common law sense, but is used in a more colloquial
sense; that the mere absence of a legal or moral obligation to make a
payment does not establish that it is a gift. If a payment proceeds
"from the incentive of an anticipated benefit of an economic nature"
it is not a gift within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code,
said the Court. For the payment to be a gift it must proceed from a
detached and disinterested generosity arising out of affection, respect,
admiration, charity or like impulse.
The full impact of the Duberstein case on the tax treatment
of voluntary payments to widows of deceased employees is yet to
be felt. Shortly after the Duberstein decision, the Tax Court de-
cided the Pierpont case.' In Pierpont the company voluntarily paid
4 See e.g., Diehl, "Payments To Widows of Corporate Employees; Recent Cases
and Rulings," So. Calif. Tax Inst. 491 (1960).
6 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 102(a). "General Rule-Gross Income does not include
the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance."
s Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 61(a). "General Definition-Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this Subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived,
including (but not limited to) the following items: (1) Compensation for services, in-
cluding fees, commissions, and similar items; .... "
7 363 U.S. 278, 5 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1626, 60-2 U.S.T.C. J 9515 (1960).
8 Estate of Mervin G. Pierpont, 35 T.C. No. 10 (1960).
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to the widow of the deceased employee an amount equal to one year's
salary of the deceased employee, paid in monthly installments over a
period of approximately thirty-three months. The Tax Court held
the payments to be a continuation of salary, taxable as income, and
not a payment intended to be a gift. In so holding, the court seemed
to ignore the objective issues involved in these kind of cases and
never really came to grips with the fundamental problems. The Tax
Court based its decision on the broad generalized language of the
Duberstein opinion, and in so doing seemed to take the position that
any continuation of salary payments to the beneficiaries of a deceased
employee constitute taxable income, except for the $5,000 statutory
exclusion. As pointed out by Judge Kern in his dissent, the Duber-
stein decision did not so hold; the problem is still a factual one, and
Duberstein did not overrule all prior authorities on this subject.
In the case of Ivan v. Nickerson,' also decided by the Tax Court,
the court did not need to resort to Duberstein to find that voluntary
payments to the beneficiaries of a deceased employee were in fact a
disguised distribution of earnings and profits. At least the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals has not been stampeded by the Duberstein
decision. In affirming the District Court of Colorado in the case of
Kasynski v. United States,10 that court rejected the argument that
a corporation in making payments to the widow of a deceased em-
ployee may not have the personalized feelings to make a gift as
required by the Duberstein case. Thus, Duberstein has not eliminated
the basic problem.
The basic problem is somewhat obscured. The Internal Revenue
Code has long contained a specific exclusion from gross income with
respect to amounts paid by the employer to a beneficiary of a de-
ceased employee. Under the 1939 Code, amounts received by a bene-
ficiary by reason of the death of the employee, if paid pursuant to a
contract, were excluded from gross income." The exclusion was
limited to $5,000 for any one employer.'" The counterpart of section
22(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 is section 101(b) of the
9 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1508, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1671 (1960).
10 284 F.2d 143 6 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6060 (1959), aff'd, 6 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5917
(10th Cir. 1960).
11 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(b). "Exclusions from Gross Income-"The following
items shall not be included in gross income ... , (1) ... amounts received ...
(B) under a contract of an employer providing for the payment of such amounts to
the beneficiaries of an employee, paid by reason of the death of the employee; . . ."
12 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(b)(1)(B). ". . . The aggregate of the amounts
excludable under subparagraph (B) by all the beneficiaries of the employee under all
such contracts of any one employer may not exceed $5,000.00."
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1954 Code. Under the 1954 Code, the requirement that the payment
be pursuant to a contract was eliminated, and the $5,000 limitation on
the exclusion was made applicable to any one employee rather than to
payments made by any one employer.3 It remains to be seen, as will
be pointed out later in this article, whether Congress intended any
more fundamental changes than the two mentioned above.
Initially, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue followed a
rather liberal policy and treated payments made to widows of de-
ceased employees "without enforceable obligation" as gifts and not
income.' 4 His position seemed to be predicated on the widow or
payee having rendered no service to the employer company in ex-
change for the payment. By 1950 the Commissioner had become less
liberal in his policy as to these payments, and announced that ir-
respective of a plan, and whether the payments were voluntary or
involuntary, or definite or indefinite, they would, if "in consideration
of services rendered by the employee" be taxable income of the
widow.' " Here the Commissioner's position seems to have been pred-
icated upon the payor company having received services. I.T. 4027
did not meet with much success and was rejected by the Tax Court in
the case of Helstrom v. Comm'r.' In holding that the voluntary
payments in that case were gifts and not income, the court set forth
as controlling factors: (1) that the payments were made to the
widow rather than the estate; (2) that the corporation had no obli-
gation to pay additional compensation to the deceased employee;
(3) that the corporation received no benefit from the payment; (4)
that the widow performed no services for the corporation; (5) and
that the husband's services had been fully compensated.
In 1958 the Commissioner, as a matter of litigation policy,
announced that as to cases arising under the 1939 Code, voluntary
payments to beneficiaries would be treated as gifts unless there was
clear evidence that the payments were intended as additional com-
pensation or as dividends.' 7
The cases under both the 1939 and the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code, indicate that widows have been extremely successful in
13 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101(b) (2) (A). "Employee Death Benefits--() Gen-
eral Rule.-Gross income does not include amounts received (whether in a single sum or
otherwise) by the beneficiaries or the estate of an employee, if such amounts are paid
by reason of the death of the employee. (2) Special Rules for Paragraph (1).-
(A) $5,000.00 Limitation.-The aggregate amounts excludable under paragraph (1) with
respect to the death of any employee shall not exceed $5,000.00."
14 I.T. 3329, 1939-2 Cum. Bull. 153.
15 I.T. 4027, 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 9.
10 24 T.C. 916 (1955).
17 Rev. Rul. 58-613, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 914.
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establishing that voluntary payments were gifts to them and not
taxable income.' An analysis of these cases does not reveal any con-
sistent objective factual pattern from which a clear-cut legal princi-
pal can be established. In the cases cited (in all of which the pay-
ments were held to be gifts), the amount of the payment ranged from
$50,000 to less than $5,000. The relationship of the payment to the
salary of the deceased employee ranged from the equivalent of three
months' salary to three years' salary. In some cases the employer
company followed a plan of making voluntary payments to others,
in some they did not. In some cases the deceased employee owned a
controlling stock interest in the employer company, and in some he
owned no stock. In some cases the payee was a stockholder, and
in some not. In only one case was the payee also an employee of
the company in her own right.19
In the case of Reed v. United States,20 the government made
a new attack in an attempt to hold the voluntary payments to
be taxable income, and by this attack has suggested that there has
been a fundamental statutory change as a result of the enactment of
section 101 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. As was pointed
out, section 22(b) of the 1939 Code was entitled "Exclusions from
Gross Income."'" The counterpart in the 1954 Revenue Code is sec-
tion 101(b) and is entitled "Employee's Death Benefits."2 In the
Reed case the Commissioner belatedly took the position that by the
enactment of section 101(b) of the Revenue Code, Congress was ad-
dressing itself to all death benefit payments, and that regardless of
the nature of such payments, any amount over $5,000 would be tax-
able as income to the payee. In holding for the taxpayer, the court
rejected the Commissioner's argument, and it seems rightfully so. It
does not appear from the change in the statute that Congress intended
to do more than eliminate the contractual provision contained in the
1939 Code, and to limit the $5,000 exclusion to one employee. How-
18 United States v. Kasynski, supra note 10; Neuhoff v. United States, 1 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 1702, 58-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9506 (SMD. Fla. 1958); Friedlander v. United States,
1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 620, 58-1 U.S.T.C. f 9182 (E.D. Wis. 1958); Rodner v. United
States, 149 F. Supp. 233, 50 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1952, 57-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9392 (S.D.N.Y.
1957); Flora B. Slater, 51 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1677, 56-2 U.S.T.C. U 9892 (S.D. Calif.
1956); Baur v. United States, 51 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1353, 57-1 U.S.T.C. f 9210 (S.D.
Ind. 1956) ; Estate of Arthur W. Hellstrom, 24 T.C. 916 (1955) ; Alice M. McFarlane, 19
T.C. 9 (1952); see also Estate of Frank J. Foote, 28 T.C. (1957); Louise K. Aprill,
13 T.C. 707 (1949).
19 United States v. Kasynski, supra note 10.
20 177 F. Supp. 205, 3 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 719, 59-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9264 (W.D. Ky.
1959), aff'd, 277 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1960).
21 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22.
22 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101(b).
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ever, it must be admitted, that there has been a change in emphasis.
Under the 1939 Code the emphasis was on the character of the pay-
ment, regardless of the number of such payments; under the 1954
version, the emphasis is on the amount rather than the character of
the payment. After the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision in the
Reed case, the Commissioner announced his nonacquiescence 3 In
accord with the Reed decision is Cowan v. United States decided by
the District Court of Georgia 24 It is understood that counsel for the
government has decided not to appeal the Cowan decision and thus
place in issue within the Fifth Circuit the Commissioner's announced
policy with respect to the Reed case. There is, by way of dictum only,
some support for the Commissioner's position taken in the Reed case.
In the Bounds case the court said:
While this controversy arises under the Internal Revenue Code of
1939 the law has now been amended and the problem with which
we are here concerned cannot arise in the future. The new law re-jects the tests which have been found unsatisfactory in practice
and unequivocally makes non-taxable payments to the employee's
estate or family, made by reason of his death, but it imposes a
$5,000 limitation.25
This issue was squarely before the Tax Court in the Pierpont
case2' but the court side-stepped it completely.
Therefore, we have two schools of thought as to whether the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 has made a substantive change in
the taxability of voluntary payments. On the one hand is the decision
of the Sixth Circuit in the Reed case supported by the District Court
of Georgia; on the other, the position of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue supported by dictum in the Rodner case (United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York), and the
Bounds case (Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals). A third possible
treatment of these payments is as a distribution of earnings and profits
rather than as a gift or some form of compensable income. Several
cases have held voluntary payments to be gifts even though the de-
ceased employee owned a controlling stock interest in the employer
company. However, in a recent Tax Court memorandum decision,2 7
the Commissioner successfully attacked the voluntary continuation
of the father's salary which was paid to his five sons over a period in
23 T.I.R. No. 252 (Sept. 12, 1960).
24 6 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5499, 60-2 U.S.T.C. 1[ 9674 (N.D. Ga. 1960).
25 Bounds v. United States, 262 F.2d 876, 3 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 389 (4th Cir.
195S).
26 Estate of Pierpont, supra note S.
27 Ivan v. Nickerson, supra note- 9.
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excess of two years, the sons being the beneficiaries of the father's
estate and succeeding to his stock in the company. Where the facts
warrant such a decision, the Commissioner will probably enjoy more
success in this area. It would also seem to follow that if the payments
are held to be a disguised distribution of earnings and profits in the
form of dividends, the $5,000 exclusion provided by section 101(b)
would not apply.
TREATMENT OF VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS BY EMPLOYER
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 such payments were
treated as "ordinary and necessary business expenses."28 I.T. 3329
issued in 193929 ruled that the voluntary payment of death benefits
was deductible to the corporation as a business expense within certain
limits. The Treasury Regulations issued under the 1939 Code pro-
vided:
When the amount of salary of an officer or employee is paid for a
limited period after his death to his widow or heirs, in recognition
for the services rendered by the individual, such payments may be
deducted . . .30
The limitation as mentioned in the Regulations and by the Com-
missioner in his publications seemed to revolve around the amount and
the duration of the payment. In the case of I. Putnam, Inc.,3 the
Tax Court approved continuing voluntary payments equivalent to the
salary of the deceased employee for a period of twenty-four months.
This limitation, both as to amount and time, seemed to constitute a
rule-of-thumb as to the amount deductible by the corporation as a
trade or business expense.
In 1954 the Commissioner seemed to shift his position from the
"limited period" concept to that of the "reasonableness of total com-
pensation." In Revenue Ruling 54-625,32 the Commissioner allowed
the deduction of an amount equivalent to one year's salary of the
deceased employee, the payment of which was to be spread over
twelve years. The Tax Court in Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.,33
considered the payment of an amount equivalent to approximately
two and a half years' salary paid to the widow over a period of five
years. The court found that the deceased employee had been under-
28 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23.
29 I.T. 3329, 1939-2 Cum. Bull. 153.
30 Treas. Reg. § 39.23(a)-9.
31 I. Putnam, Inc., 15 T.C. 86 (1950).
32 Rev. Rul. 54-625, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 85.
33 31 T.C. 1080, aff'd on other grounds, 281 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1960).
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paid during bad times and that the payments made to the widow were
a combination of gifts to her and additional compensation.
In the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section
162 became the counterpart of the old section 23 (a). However, section
23(p)(i) of the 1939 Code pertaining to the payment of deferred
compensation was not re-enacted as a subsection of section 162, but
was contained in a new section 404 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 dealing with deductibility of deferred compensation generally.34
If a payment can be deducted as a trade or business expense under
section 162, it can be accrued and taken as a deduction by an "accrual
basis" taxpayer. On the other hand, under section 404(a) (5), a de-
duction may be taken only in the year of actual payment regardless
of the system of accounting used by the employer taxpayer. The
Commissioner has now taken the position, both by Regulation 3' and
otherwise, that all payments made to widows or beneficiaries of a
voluntary nature are the equivalent of additional compensation to the
employee under a deferred plan and hence only deductible in the year
when actually paid.3 6
THE SAME PAYMENT AS CONSTITUTING A GIFT TO THE WIDOW AND
AN ORDINARY AND NECESSARY BUSINESS EXPENSE TO THE
CORPORATION
The present state of law seems to indicate that a given payment
can be treated as a gift to the widow or beneficiary (hence excludable
from her income) and the payment of an ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expense by the company (hence deductible by the company for
tax purposes).
There are those who maintain that once the nature of a payment
has been established, the treatment of it should be uniform for all
purposes and as to all taxpayers. The Supreme Court of the United
States, in a 5-4 decision, held that the payment of the same amount
cannot be both a gift and compensation.37 In a strong dissent in that
case, Justices Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo, and Black pointed out that,
"The Categories of gift and compensation are not always mutually
exclusive, but can at times overlap."
34 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 404.
35 Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-12 (1956). "... Similarly, if amounts are paid as a
death benefit to the beneficiaries of an employee (for example, by continuing his
salary for a reasonable period) and if such amounts meet the requirements of Section
162 or 121, such amounts are deductible under Section 404(a)(5) in any case when
they are not deductible under the other paragraph of Section 404(a)."
36 Champion Spark Plug, 30 T.C. 295, aff'd, 266 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1959), non.-acq.,
1958-2 Cum. Bull. 9.
37 Bogardus v. Comm'r, 302 U.S. 34, 19 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1195, 37-2 U.S.T.C.
ff 9534 (1937).
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The Tax Court in Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.,38 found that
voluntary payments could be gifts on the one hand but nevertheless
deductible by the corporation as a necessary business expense. Seldom
are both issues before a court in the same case. Furthermore, this
question has not been placed in issue because the Commissioner has
failed to question the deduction in those cases wherein he sought to
tax the payments to the widow as income. There is no assurance that
the Commissioner will continue this practice.
If one is unable to accept the "dual nature" of these payments
and concludes that what is a gift to the payee must also be a gift by
the payor company, the Commissioner will have yet another avenue
of attack, which as yet he has not taken in any of the reported cases.
This relates to the gift tax and constructive receipt of dividends ques-
tion. While the gift tax statute contemplates that gifts will be made
only by individuals,39 the Regulations provide that a transfer by a
corporation by way of gift constitutes a gift by the shareholders of the
corporation, and that if the donee is also a shareholder, it is a gift to
him by the other shareholders, unless the transfer is deemed to be a
distribution of earnings and profits or a distribution in liquidation4
Assuming the validity of this Regulation, this would mean that in all
cases where the voluntary payment was held to be a gift by the
corporation, it would then be deemed to be a gift by the shareholders
of the corporation and that if that portion of the gift allocated to
any shareholder would exceed $3,000, the excess could constitute a
taxable gift, unless exempt under the donor's life time exemption. As
a corollary, would it not also follow that if the shareholder has made
a gift to the widow or beneficiary, it could only have been made out
of a distribution of earnings and profits constructively received by the
donor shareholder? If so, not only would the corporation lose the
deduction but the donor shareholders would be liable for income tax
on the dividend income constructively received. As a practical matter,
the gift tax question involving shareholders would arise only in those
cases wherein there would be a very closely held corporation and a
rather substantial payment to the widow or the beneficiary. However,
every case of a voluntary payment of this kind would involve serious
consideration if the amount is to be allocated and taxed to the share-
holders as dividend income under the constructive receipt theory. It
isn't likely that we have seen the end of litigation on this question.
38 Supra note 33.
39 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2501.
40 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511(h) (1958). See also H.R. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
27 (1932) ; S. Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1932).
